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CASENOTES 133 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION-SCHOOL 
SEGREGATION REVIVED 
Plaintiffs brought suit for themselves and all other tax-
payers in Wagoner County, Oklahoma, to enjoin the Board of 
County Commissioners from delivering to purchasers school bonds 
which were voted for the acquisition, maintenance, and repair 
10 Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., 196 Wis. 196, 218 N.W. 855, 60 A.L.R. 
357 (1928); see Annot., 60 A.L.R. 371 (1929). 
llRestatement, Torts§ 385 (1934). 
12Allen, Learned and Unlearned Reason, 36 Jurid. Rev. 254, 263 (1924); 
Prosser, Torts§§ 37, 241 (1st ed. 1941). 
13 38 Am. Jur., Negligence§§ 317-319 (1941). 
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of segregated schools. The lower court ruled that the recent de-
cision of the United States Supreme Court ,in Brown v. Board of 
Education of Topeka1 which nullified statutes providing for segre-
gation of races in schools did not negate other statutes2 providing 
for the acquisition, maintenance, and repair of separate schools 
under a segregated system, and that such an acquisition was legal. 
Plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma. Held: 
affirmed.3 
This case is one of the first examples of a successful attempt 
by a state to circumvent the decision against segregation. 
The plaintiffs alleged that the bond issue was illegal as 
repugnant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Fed-
eral Constitution.4 
An early decision established the "public purpose" doctrine 
relating to bond issues.5 This doctrine prohibits municipal taxa-
tion for purposes not primarily beneficial to the community as a 
whole.° For the same reason, bonds cannot be issued for pur-
poses which would not support valid tax assessments, the theory 
being that bonds, when issued, are merely an anticipation of the 
taxes needed to pay them.7 Thus, under the recent Supreme Court 
decisions, it would seem that public taxes for the support of 
segregated schools would be unconstitutional. 
The Oklahoma court based its decision on the grounds that 
the statutes under which the bonds were issued provide for the 
maintenance of the public school system. The fact that schools 
thus maintained will be segregated was purported to have no 
bearing on the issue.s Thus, the legal fiction of accomplishing 
by indirection what' cannot be done directly was successfully em-
ployed. 
1 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
:l Okla. Stat. tit: 7'0; §§ 15-7 to 15-13 (1951). 
31\Iatlock v. Board of County Comm'rs, 281 P.2d 169 (Okla. 1955). 
4Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), held that segregation in 
public schools is a deprivation of liberty in violation of the due process 
clause of the Fifth Amendment. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 
:~47 U.S. 483 (1954), held that segregation deprived the plaintiffs and 
others similarly situated of the equal protection of the laws as guaranteed 
by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
&Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147, 168-169, 174 (1853) 
(upholding the investment of municipal funds in the bonds of a privately 
owned railroad). 
o People ex rel. Detroit & Howell R.R. v. Salem, 20 Mich. 452, 474-
494 (1870); see Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 454 (1873). 
7 City of Clearwater v. State, 108 Fla. 623, 147 So. 459, 460 (1933). 
~Matlock v. Board of County Comm'rs, 281 P.2d 169, 171 (Okla. 1955). 
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It is submitted that if the acquisition of new school grounds 
was to provide for the ever increasing number of school children, 
and with the full intent of integrating all schools as soon as prac-
ticable, the bond issue would be for a valid purpose. The period 
of transition to desegregated schools should not require the school 
systems to remain static. 
However, in the light of strong southern feeling against the 
Supreme Court decision, especially as evidenced by recent cases 
involving similar problems, it does not seem that such an in-
tention can be assumed. 
A Florida court upheld the validity of a bond issue for the 
purpose of building segregated schools and stated that the Brown 
decision was a great mistake and that the state legislature should 
determine whether the doctrine of "separate but equal" has a 
place in the field of public education.0 In addition, Negroes have 
been denied their right to attend integrated public schools on 
the ground that the Supreme Court's decision does not require 
immediate desegregation of schools.10 Thus, the Oklahoma court 
has joined a general southern refusal to carry out promptly the 
mandate of the Supreme Court. 
Any action by a state intended to prolong segregation, or at 
least to postpone desegregation, is clearly inconsistent with the 
mandate of the Supreme Court. This was unequivocally estab-
lished in May, 1955, by a supplemental decision to the first Brown 
case.11 The Court stated that Negroes should be admitted "as 
soon as practicable," that school authorities must "act in good 
faith" and make a "prompt and reasonable start" toward desegre-
gation, that Negroes should be admitted on a nondiscrimina-
tory basis "with all deliberate speed," and that only in extremely 
difficult cases will an extension of time be granted. 
In compliance with this clear statement of intent, a recent 
Virginia case held that taxpayers could enjoin the issuance of 
bonds which were to finance segregated schools, stating that in 
the future the state can operate only nonsegregated schools.12 
It is submitted that if the present decision is not reversed, 
o Board of Public Instruction v. State, 75 So.2d 832 (Fla. 1954). 
10 Steiner v. Simmons, 111 A.2d 574 (Del. 1955); reversing decision 
in 108 A.2d 173 (Del. 1954). 
11 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 295 (1955). 
12 Shelton v. County School Bd. of Hanover, 23 U.S.L. Week 2630 (June 
2, 1955). 
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it will result in segregation in Oklahoma taking on a new "legal" 
status which is in direct conflict with the Supreme Court deci-
sions holding segregation unconstitutional. 
Marshall D. Becker, '58 
